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Abstract
Cryptocurrency, or digital currency that utilizes blockchain technology and cryptography
to encode transactions, has excited many with the promise of minimizing governance. Although
the structure of cryptocurrency is inherently decentralized, cryptocurrency relies upon complex
relationships between different actors with various functions and roles.. The execution of
cryptocurrency thus depends on the mutually satisfying interactions of these actors, who form the
basis for non-technical governance structures.
This paper investigates the extent to which technical governance mitigates traditional
governance problems by examining the governance structures of two cryptocurrencies. It first
gives background into the origin and technical value proposition of cryptocurrency, as well as
governance theory, before analyzing Bitcoin and Ethereum to understand whEther technology
mitigates actors’ motivations. This paper finds that despite cryptocurrency’s promise of
minimizing governance, both Bitcoin and Ethereum rely heavily on trust networks, indicating
that elements of non-technical governance are, in fact, crucial to their effectiveness.

Keywords: cryptocurrency, governance theory, blockchain

Research discipline: Business
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INTRODUCTION
Origins of Cryptocurrency
Although many consider cryptocurrency to be a recent phenomenon, the idea of applying
cryptographic elements to digital currency was in fact first pioneered in 1982. Dr. David Chaum,
a researcher in the field of cryptography and mathematics, put forth the idea as the first solution
to high governance costs in monetary contractions. Chaum was primarily concerned with finding
a e-money solution that was both anonymous and free from double spending, a common issue in
digital payments where a unit of money can be spent on multiple transactions simultaneously
(Chaum 1983, 200). At the time, there were two major hurdles in the creation and adoption of
digital currency: the first was the ability of digital signatures to be easily copied and reproduced,
endangering users’ personal information and bank account data; the second was people’s concern
with the level of automation inherent in digital systems (Lee ed. 2016, 1015). Chaum’s solution
to these problems incorporated a trusted third party (TTP), usually a bank, to approve the use of
e-money through a cryptographic digital signature. The signature was designed to be randomized
such that banks could not track the payment or amount back to the spender, ensuring anonymity
(Lee ed. 1016). Chaum’s exploratory digital currency, DigiCash, and other similar digital
currencies appeared in the 1980s and 1990s but were commercially unsuccessful, largely due to a
declining user base (Higgins 2014). Furthermore, the inclusion of TTPs did not provide a valid
enough incentive to use an online system at a time when technology had not reached widespread
adoption, and DigiCash incurred high costs to integrate e-commerce practices with established
banks (Higgins). However, this period saw the rise of digital payment verification systems and
online cards, such as PayPal, which increased awareness for the application of technology to
personal banking (Higgins). Despite its failure, DigiCash dictated future research into digital
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currencies that completely eliminated the need for institutional structures and TTPs to generate
user buy-in, which set the stage for the creation of the modern cryptocurrency.

Emergence of Bitcoin:
It is impossible to discuss the emergence of cryptocurrency without first characterizing
blockchain, its underlying technical infrastructure. Blockchain refers to the system of
independently verified and cryptographically linked blocks that comprise a single immutable
ledger. On a blockchain, transactions are stored using Merkle Tree, a structure that stores a
hierarchy of hashes of data, to record all previous blocks on the system (Conti et. al. 4). The
system thus preserves a history of all activity that exists electronically across multiple
participants and cannot be modified by any single user. The idea of blockchain was first
conceptualized by Satoshi Nakamoto (pseudonym) in 2008 in his landmark paper “Bitcoin: A
Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” as the infrastructure to support his digital currency,
Bitcoin. Its creation was aimed to stem the growing transaction costs and security concerns that
consumers faced in the financial markets by building upon Chaum’s initial ideas, and improving
the technology behind digital currency. Thus, cryptocurrency was essentially founded on the
basis of reducing costs associated with governance that had largely been handled by TTPs.
The technical infrastructure of Bitcoin has two major developments from previous digital
currencies. As the first successful decentralized “cryptocurrency”, Bitcoin applied the use of
cryptography, or the practice of securing data using algorithms and protocols, to protect
information that existed on the currency’s network (Dent 2006, 3215). Specifically, Bitcoin
employed hash functions, or functions that mapped inputs to outputs, in order to identify
payments (Lee ed. 1017). Furthermore, Bitcoin used digital signatures as binding approvals to
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legitimate the transfer of money (Lee ed. 1017). The creation of both hash functions and digital
signatures preempted Bitcoin’s success relative to its predecessors, ensuring security on the
system.
Bitcoin primarily mitigated the need for TTPs by employing a distributed ledger,
effectively replacing trust with cryptographic proofs (Nakamoto 2008, 1). Nakamoto defined a
Bitcoin as a “chain of digital signatures” that effectively linked a hash of previous payments to
the account of the future coin owner (2). For transactions to occur between participants in the
system, this required they be publicly announced, and developed a central immutable history of
when payments were received. As such, the system proposed the use of a timestamp server,
which published the hash of a block of transactions onto the chain while simultaneously
reinforcing the timestamps before it. In place of a single TTP, Nakamoto proposed to employ a
system of widely distributed intermediaries, termed “miners” because their activities correlated
with the creation of new coins, in order to approve transactions. Bitcoin also used an asymmetric
cryptosystem, which utilized both a public key, an identifier that could be used to send and
receive payments on the network, and a private key, known only to the user to protect personal
information (Dent 3217). Theoretically, this would allow users to interact with the blockchain
network without using any unique identifiers, preserving anonymity, instead of conferring
sensitive information in TTPs to process payments.
An end-to-end overview of a common Bitcoin transaction according to Nakamoto would
occur as follows. A user might generate a transaction to another user by using the payee’s public
key. This transaction would contain several key components: the version of Bitcoin; the hash or
ID of the transaction; and several inputs, including a reference to the previous transaction that
coin was involved in (transferring it from an output to an input), an index of previous unspent
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output, and unlocking script conditions that ensure that the unspent previous transaction output
(UTXO) is sufficient to cover the subsequent transaction. Because the new input would be
generated entirely from the previous transaction, the entire value of the previous transaction
would also be featured in the output. If the value of the amount to be transferred were to be less
than the UTXO, the sender would provide the public key of an additional wallet (usually one of
their own) to receive the difference. This would give every coin, spent or unspent, a historical
ledger account. The transaction is then added to a block, which refers to the series of successive
transactions that are grouped togEther in the ledger (Nakamoto 3-4).
In order to prevent double spending, Bitcoin utilizes a distributed consensus and proofof-work mechanism. Distributed consensus refers to the majority of miners that validate a
transaction before it is added to the blockchain (Lee ed. 1099). The proof-of-work (PoW)
mechanism is a cryptographic puzzle that requires miners to find a value, termed a nonce, that
when hashed, produces a number with a certain number of zeroes that precedes it (Nakamoto 3).
The puzzle increases in difficulty every two weeks in order that the system stays competitive;
this, in turn, ensures that the money supply grows at a fixed rate in its pursuit of the Bitcoin fixed
supply (3). PoW has a consensus algorithm that imposes five primary rules: input/output values
must be rational; transactions can only spend unspent outputs; all inputs have to contain valid
digital signatures (e.g. valid historical transactions); transactions must be spent within a certain
number of blocks of their creation; and no transactions can spend inputs before the stated
locktime (Nakamoto 7). Miners collect transactions in blocks by calculating the hash of that
block in addition to the nonces of the individual transactions (3). Most cryptocurrencies employ
a unique hash function that corresponds to the target hash value (Bitcoin’s hash function is
termed SHA-256 for the 256 bit number that is produced) (Lee ed. 1016). The difficulty of the
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puzzle is correlated directly to the target value ascribed, as lower target values correspond to
fewer solutions. When a miner calculates the correct hash value for a block, it immediately
broadcasts the block in the network, after which all other nodes will independently verify the
value by comparing it to the target value, and add it to their local blockchains (Nakamoto 4). The
Bitcoin infrastructure targets an average mining time of 10 minutes per block (Bitcoin Wiki
“Block”). Miners are compensated with a fixed fee of newly mined coins, as well as a transaction
fee (decided at the discretion of the user who initiates the transaction). (Nakamoto 3-4)
In sum, Bitcoin’s value proposition primarily promises a governance system that is based
on blockchain. It grants a number of benefits: anonymity to users and miners through its
asymmetric cryptosystem; cheaper transactions due to the elimination of TTPs; incentive
structures for miners built into its technical infrastructure; stable currency value; inclusive
financial access; and finally, public documentation of all transactions that can be viewed by any
and all parties (The Bitcoin Foundation “The Bitcoin Foundation Manifesto” 2). The technical
system proposed by Nakamoto distributes power across a larger network that eliminates the need
for traditional governance systems, as the infrastructure purports to replace systems of trust and
relationships with anonymity and distributed power in an open source network. Enabling
anonymity in the infrastructure through distributed governance was considered a crucial benefit
derived from blockchain, as Nakamoto theorized that the lack of anonymity would create low
barriers to entry, higher buy-in from stakeholders, and more efficient payment processing speeds
(2).
Bitcoin has since spawned new types of cryptocurrencies based on the blockchain,
leading to a robust and competitive market. As of 2018, there are over one thousand
cryptocurrencies in existence; Bitcoin remains the largest by market capitalization, peaking at a
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value of nearly $20,000 per coin in late 2017, and has since fallen to around $9,000 in 2018
(Kharpal “Cryptocurrencies are heading for a 90 percent correction in ‘mass market wipe out,’
investment bank warns”). The most viable competitor that has emerged to Bitcoin is Ethereum, a
cryptocurrency that is executed under a system of smart contracts (discussed in further detail in
this paper’s analysis), an infrastructure that represents a stark divergence from the original
Bitcoin framework. The novel value proposition of cryptocurrency has also generated a
significant amount of investor interest in the growth of the industry. Meanwhile, the blockchain
infrastructure itself has been widely applied to a number of industries, including financial
services, healthcare, and entertainment (Olleros and Zhegu ed. 243).

Issues of Governance in Cryptocurrency
The technical infrastructure Nakamoto outlined for Bitcoin implies a non-technical
governance structure with different actors. The nature of the system itself distributes technical
power, forming the basis for decentralized governance. The cryptocurrency system is defined by
several key stakeholders that each carry a crucial function: users, who choose to send and receive
payments on the blockchain network; miners, who both verify transactions and mine new coins
at a preordained rate set by the system to keep the money supply consistent; developers, who
create and update the system; and finally, external stakeholders, such as nonprofit foundations,
wallets, and currency exchanges, that affect the funding and development of cryptocurrency. The
promise of cryptocurrency thus fundamentally does not entirely eliminate governance, but
redefines it from traditional employer/employee or contractual relationships toward trustless,
virtual interactions that attempt to reduce the existence of formal governance structures.
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One explicit way that non-technical governance is addressed and alluded to in the Bitcoin
White Paper is through Nakamoto’s discussion on miner attacks. As a whole, he considers the
system tamper proof because each block of transactions contains a hash of the previous block;
attempting to change, for example, the unique hash or timestamp server of a transaction would
be caught almost immediately by other miner nodes. However, he identifies instances in which
miners may not behave as expected by the system in order to gain advance rights to mining.
Another potential issue he identifies is unintential forking, or the creation of multiple transaction
recording blockchains, usually caused by delayed signaling due to network latency and traffic.
Nakamoto contends that although multiple blockchains will temporarily be created, miners will
be incentivized to add only to the longest chain. Nakamoto also addresses types of miner attacks
that could occur, but emphasizes that when the majority of miners are “honest”, or mine
according to protocol, the entire system runs smoothly. These attacks, along with the rise of
different mining groups, will be discussed in subsequent Bitcoin specific analysis, but their
inclusion in the White Paper itself implies that Nakamoto was considering aspects of governance
in the creation of Bitcoin (6).
Furthermore, despite the novelty of cryptocurrency’s technical infrastructure, recent
developments indicate that governance may play a larger role than anticipated by cryptocurrency
creators. Four primary areas, examined in further detail in the ensuing paragraphs, are
particularly salient: the multitude of currency forks; emerging private cryptocurrencies
reevaluating the very value proposition of Bitcoin and imposing centralized governance systems;
the involvement of the SEC in regulating cryptocurrency; and finally, investor interest and
financing mechanisms surrounding cryptocurrency introducing the notion of external influence
on governance systems.

10

Currency forks occur when there is a fundamental disagreement about a technical
characteristic in a cryptocurrency, leading to the creation of a new digital infrastructure (Gervais,
Karame, Capkun and Capkun 4-5). There are two primary classifications of currency forks. Soft
forks can be made to a software upgrade that cause a temporary split in the blockchain; these
changes are usually non-controversial and implemented by majority, and transition quickly as
nodes, who vote to improve the system, simply upgrade to the new system and mine on the new
chain instead. Soft forks have the advantage of being able to apply to previous transactions
seamlessly, making them reverse compatible (Liew and Hewlett 2017, 5). In contrast, hard forks
represent a permanent split from the original blockchain that occurs when there are conflicts
about fundamental issues in the underlying system (Liew and Hewlett 5). Hard forks require all
nodes to upgrade: thus, if a majority of nodes do not choose to adopt the new system, and two
independent cryptocurrencies begin to operate on separate system. Meanwhile, users and miners
can only operate on one since they are incompatible (Liew and Hewlett 5). The rise in the
number of currency forks in recent years brings into question the stability of cryptocurrency and
has drawn attention to governance, especially decision rights; who has the right to initiate or
approve forks and to what extent forks are beneficial for the users of cryptocurrency.
One of the key value propositions from Nakamoto’s original paper was the anonymity
associated with cryptocurrency, and its open source infrastructure to encourage widespread
adoption as a mode of payment. However, many investors have recently begun to call this
anonymity into question. While each user employs a private key to encode his or her
transactions, the public availability of all transactions on a ledger theoretically could allow for
someone to trace multiple transactions back to the same individual (Tennant 2017, 1). One
solution that has been developed to this issue is “mixing”, a process by which users form
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collectives to mix up the coins they transact with in order to prevent any transactions to be traced
back to a single individual (Tennant 1). Leading cryptocurrencies have also been adopting
private networks to further combat the issue of security (Olleros and Zhegu 2016, 231). These
networks differ fundamentally both amongst cryptocurrencies and from the original
infrastructure proposed by Nakamoto. The emergence of these structures brings about questions
referring to the changing value proposition of cryptocurrencies and the governance systems that
are now being employed to support them.
The questions surrounding the legal viability of cryptocurrency have been promulgated
around the world in the last several years. Recently, the SEC has moved to define cryptocurrency
as a security, and imposed regulations on cryptocurrency exchange (Michaels 2018). This brings
into question the potential of the SEC to classify cryptocurrency as a security, which in turn
would lead to the potential for capital gains tax. External questions about the viability of
cryptocurrency are closely tied to the internal regulation of the systems; who is in charge, how
can security breaches be compensated, and how are shareholders protected. The next several
years will see heightened attention drawn to the internal governance of cryptocurrency, and will
force these systems themselves to rethink how they approach internal governance.
Most visibly, cryptocurrency has gained widespread public notoriety and attention in the
investor market. Heightened awareness of cryptocurrency has resulted in extreme price volatility.
The price of Bitcoin, for example, peaked at nearly $20,000 in late 2017, and has declined over
50% in 2018 (Adkisson 2018). Ethereum has also appreciated 5000% in value since the
beginning of the year (Coinbase 2018). While some industry experts speculate that the rapid
price increase in cryptocurrency represents a temporary bubble, other investors are clamoring for
the novel technology and in the power of consensus for the wide use of cryptocurrency. This
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interest has also led to the integration of cryptocurrency with financial markets, introducing
cryptocurrency to a whole host of investors and contingent factors. Bitcoin Futures have recently
debuted to high prices, allowing investors to speculate on the price of coins without owning the
currency (Reuters 2017). Given that the internal governance of cryptocurrency is highly geared
toward aligning stakeholder interest through ownership of the currency, this new development
poses new risks for the correlation between speculation and actual cryptocurrency value due to
potential external influence (Pauw 2017). Finally, the increase in visibility of cryptocurrency has
called into question how investors should evaluate the different types of cryptocurrency available
in the market and how governance structure will play into long-term success.
The technical premise of cryptocurrency, along with these four recent trends, seem to
indicate that the non-technical attributes of cryptocurrency warrant further analysis. This idea
seems to be promulgated among the cryptocurrencies as well. Specifically, the interplay between
the non-technical interactions of economic actors within the cryptocurrency governance system
and the technical system itself creates a space for further analysis.

RESEARCH QUESTION:
Nakamoto’s thesis for cryptocurrency outlines a technical structure that is built on the
notion of decentralization. However, he simultaneously sets the stage for a rich non-technical
ecosystem that exists to support the technical infrastructure. Given the unique nature of
cryptocurrency and how relatively little attention has been paid to its non-technical attributes,
this paper will examine to what extent the promise of technology mitigates governance by
analyzing what strategies of governance Bitcoin and Ethereum have put in place. Specifically,
this paper aims to relate the technical value proposition of each currency to understand whEther
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aspects of traditional governance are successfully circumnavigated or replicated. In effect, the
research question this paper aims to answer is: what strategies of governance are in place for
cryptocurrencies? It hypothesizes that cryptocurrency’s technical infrastructure does not
effectively lessen the need for formal governance; the development of non-technical governance
structures are inevitable in cryptocurrency. Furthermore, this paper finds that non-technical
attributes of governance, specifically trust and intrinsic motivation, are, in fact, crucial to the
successful utilization of cryptocurrency and that further attention should be paid to how these
structures are put in place.
In defining the scope of the research question, this paper will focus on the two largest
cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum; this choice was consciously made to ensure that there
would be sufficient information and development of governance structures for analysis across
two different technical structures. While there are a number of governance issues that have
surrounded cryptocurrencies from outside legal entities, including their status and allowance by
the SEC, and the dubious legality of initial coin offerings (ICOs) as funding mechanisms, this
paper focuses exclusively on the impact of governance structures internal to each
cryptocurrency. One of the reasons for this is the international nature of cryptocurrency itself has
resulted in inconsistent external policy that has not yet provided a space for meaningful analysis.

OVERVIEW OF GOVERNANCE THEORY:
At a basic level, governance refers to the rules that manage the actions of any type of
entity (Rezaee 2009, 17). The goal of governance is to create a system of checks and balances to
enhance overall shareholder value while simultaneously protecting the interests of all
stakeholders (30). Governance thus functions to curb the potential powers of different groups of
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actors who have stake in the firm. The theoretical foundation of governance depicts the types of
outcomes that are predicted by the analysis of the behavior of actors within a firm, and how types
of transactions define firm and governance structures. In addition to providing a short overview
of classical governance theory, and its shift toward behavioral explanations, this section explores
the emergence of open source software programs and the governance structures they have
implemented to better understand what aspects of traditional governance technology has begun
to minimize
Governance theory emerged to explain and provide alternative structures to contracting,
which exists as the most common and salient alternative to enforce rules. A contract is legally
enforceable agreement between two or more parties (Werbach 2015, 315). Generally, according
to Grossman and Hart (1986) governance is considered more advantageous than contracting
when the roles of stakeholders are clearly defined and there are multiple contributors or joint
ownership of a resource, leading to less predictable ex post outcomes that can be accurately
contracted at efficient costs ex ante (718). Contracts thus create a tradeoff by imposing specific
monetary consequences to curb malicious action, but also require costs of enforcement. The
definition of “contracting” has also come to include “implicit” contracts in addition to
traditionally observed explicit formal contracts. Klein et al. (1978) define implicit contracts as a
“guarantee enforced by the market mechanism of withdrawing future business if opportunistic
behavior occurs” (303). Implicit contracts occur when the advantage of joint ownership is
decreased relative to economizing on contracting costs necessary to insure non-opportunistic
behavior (299). In effect, governance and implicit contracts rely on the complex and often
interrelated behaviors of multiple individuals, given that contracting is a viable option. A central
theme in governance is simultaneously offering incentives for good behavior (e.g. behavior that
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works toward the overall goal) while placing restriction on negative behavior to ensure task
completion at ultimate efficiency. Governance is also only considered useful as long as it is
effective relative to alternative incentive structures.
Early governance theory serves to demonstrate that systems of governance or contracting
emerge to enforce relationships associated with economic activity, and are viewed as necessary
only for particular transactions. Central to corporate governance theory is the characterization of
the firm: how and why it comes into being, what properties it naturally contains, and why it
represents an efficient structure of governance. The first work to delineate the characteristics that
define different types of firm governance was Ronald Coase’s “The Nature of the Firm” in 1937.
Coase (1937) posited that firms were centralizing authorities that existed to economize the cost
of coordinating economic activity, as dependent on both the costs of organizing and the
efficiency of the coordination (390). Coase also characterized the idea of “agency” costs, or
finding a transaction type and incentive structure that could minimize the negative actions of a
manager, or residual claimant to firm value (395). Coase defined the costs of transacting across a
number of dimensions, including search costs, bargaining costs, and enforcement costs that could
be used to assess alternative actions of stakeholders in cryptocurrency (396-7). To Coase,
centralization naturally implied stricter and more costly types of governance that were only
relevant for certain types of market transactions (394). In essence, not every type of transaction
required a firm, and therefore governance.
Oliver Williamson built upon Coase’s landmark findings in his theory of transaction cost
economics. Specifically, Williamson (1979) argued that certain dimensions of a transaction
dictate the structure of governance that should surround it (244). He determined that transaction
costs are naturally higher in contexts with high uncertainty, low frequency, and high asset
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specificity; in effect, costs are defined on dimensions of whether transactions are predictable and
skill specific to both the firm and its economic actors (239). Williamson also theorized that the
time horizon of a transacting relationship also had important implications for governance, as it
increased potential transaction costs and required greater stakeholder incentive in the system
(251). This language will be used to describe the tradeoffs made by stakeholders in
cryptocurrency in subsequent analysis. Together, Coase and Williamson created a basis for
governance theory that serves as a way to control and motivate individuals acting toward a
common goal. Understanding the types of transactions and the roles or functions required to
achieve the end goals are crucial in shaping a governance structure that allows for specific
characteristics of the exchange, including its asset specificity and time horizon. Additionally,
actors are motivated to work within a governance system, as opposed to a contractual obligation
for which there are legal ramifications if not followed, given their own limitations, namely
opportunism and bounded rationality, as well as the costs they incur of completing the
transaction relative to other actions. Thus ultimately governance theory is built around human
behavior, leading to subsequent analysis from Williamson and James March on the varying
composition of the firm in relation to actor incentives.
The link between transaction costs and incentive structures to Williamson (1979) was
determined by two key constraints on economic actors: opportunism, self interest with guile, and
bounded rationality, inherent information asymmetries in the knowledge of economic actors.
Williamson then argued that the unintentional effects of bounded rationality led individuals to
behave opportunistically to the detriment of the firm (241). Thus, Williamson argued that
organizations should economize on bounded rationality while limiting stakeholder opportunism
to create the most potential value (245-6). This idea was also reflected in Alchian and Demsetz’
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(1972) analysis of employee incentives. The authors’ main finding was that when individual
output was difficult to directly observe and benefits were collectively born, but costs were born
individually, individual contracting was costly and ineffective (777). Two distinct problems,
those surrounding metering and shirking incentives amongst workers in a group, characterized
whether hierarchy, and thus a firm structure, arose. Alchian and Demsetz also characterized a
“residual claimant” who is incentivized by ownership to contribute and accurate monitor
production (783). Williamson ultimately theorized that actors within a firm are constrained by
their bounded rationality and self-interest through opportunism, indicating that the formal
structure of governance should reflect behavioral elements of actors rather than the distinctive
nature of the transaction.
In his seminal essay “The Business Firm as a Political Coalition”, James March (1962)
moved beyond describing the behavioral motivations of individual action from Williamson to
impute game theory models of conflict resolution onto firm decision-making. He began by
noting that traditional models of firm theory that treat individuals within a firm as units with
discrete interests that come together to maximize their joint preference have nearly always been
disproved (669). He then argued that the imputation of a superordinate goal (most commonly
profit maximization) as the driving force for firm activities was a facetious lens into firm
decision making (670). Instead, he applied political theory frameworks that viewed actors within
a firm as different interest groups that make various demands on the system (671). In March's
model. each coalition has potential control over the system, mirroring the natural divergence of
interests among actors in the firm. He ultimately argued that these conflict systems required a
centralized "politician" to both mediate conflict by ordering the coalitions by viability and
importance (e.g. maximize resource use within the firm) (672). He wrote that the goals and
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composition of a firm are negotiated and bargained in the pursuit of hierarchically organizing
these interests (672). In determining that superordinate goals did not in fact exist, March argued
that governance by centralization was a natural tendency of the firm, a fact that had been ignored
in viewing the firm as a fixed construct. This occurred naturally as actor interests shifted
overtime and therefore shifted firm goals to align with them.
Building on his theory of transaction cost economics, Williamson (1993) determined that
exogenous factors in the firm that arise as a result of relationships can have profound impact on
the effectiveness of the structure. He asserted that trust based systems exist differently in the
presence of contractual safeguards, placing heightened importance on the systems in which
contracts are embedded within (476). He defined trust as “the risk one takes depend[ing] on the
performance of another actor” which was undertaken “when the expected gain from placing
oneself at risk to another is positive, but not otherwise” (463). Trustworthiness implies
cooperation with potential, net-neutral penalty rather than a fixed financial reward guiding one’s
actions. The conditions for trust according to Williamson (stemming from Dasgupta) were as
follows: individuals must have repeated encounters and memory of previous experiences; there
must be a cost to honest behavior; and finally, reputation must have stake within the system,
(466). Trust thus required relationships between actors to form in order to exist. Williamson built
on his writing on the contextual factors of transaction types to include the concept of institutional
environments, calling for further specification in the types of governance systems employed. In
effect, he theorized that institutional environments provided safeguards against undesirable
behavior to varying degrees that characterized further the types of transactions being conducted
(476). Additionally, culture plays a large role in defining institutional environments, and serves
as a check on opportunism by imposing social conditioning on the acts of members of a
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particular institutional environment. Strong cultures increase the potency of social sanctions and
remorse on the part of an individual with malicious intentions, which makes organizations more
effective (476). Institutional environments are often maintained by the upkeep of social accounts
that become ineffective when turned into financial or legal obligations; as such, Williamson
wrote that “there are some transactions for which the optimal level of conscious metering is
zero” (481). He defined personal trust by the absence of monitoring, favorable preferences, and
discreteness amongst individuals; in effect personal trust fosters greater alignment between
individuals and organizations (483-4). Through these arguments, Williamson demonstrated that
contracting is impaired when institutional factors already incentivize certain types of behavior,
further indicating that trust and other non-institutionalized factors actually play a huge role in the
overall effectiveness of a governance structure. In effect he theorized that trust is an inevitable
source of governance enhancement.
Together, the arguments of Williamson and March introduce a new concept of
governance that is based around its actors alone: that people are influenced by one another and
their social structures, and as this happens, their interests relative to one another change, forcing
the governance structures themselves to change. The implications that the firm derives its
activity based on actors’ interests inherently means that its composition, and therefore
governance structure, will always inevitably change. The superordinate goal is in fact to adapt to
the incentives and behaviors of the actors within the system, because, as both March and
Williamson assert, actors in the system will always advance their own agenda without regard for
firm processes.
March’s characterization also brought to light the key role of decision rights within the
firm. Decision rights refer to the systems, constraints, and roles that firms use in decision making
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(Athey and Roberts 2001, 200). March compared the decision rights structure of the firm to the
influence of interest groups on political coalitions, with competing resource and interest
offerings defining their abilities to perform tasks effectively and defines governance as a series
of conflict resolution techniques (671). He noted that the demands actors make in a political
system shift in response to experience within the system, and the perception of problems they
might face (673). Goals and decisions in the firm thus appeared to be paired but decentralized.
Athey and Roberts have added to this analysis by characterizing decision rights in the nonclassical firm. The design of incentive schemes and decision rights structures are inevitably
interlinked, as the means of affected a specific behavior usually result in offering incentives for
alternative behaviors; the incentives for effort and for decisions are inextricably tied together
(200). In effect, decision rights constitutes yet another behavior that motivates governance
structure by reflecting constituent interest. The collective bargaining that occurs in the very
creation of the firm also occurs at the level of decision rights, when future outcomes are
measured by the utility of each individual actor.
Given cryptocurrency’s reliance on blockchain as a technical interface to act as
governance, this paper would be remiss if it did not explore new types of governance structures
that have emerged to reflect the ability of technology to facilitate decentralized communication.
Crucial to the analysis of cryptocurrency is the rise of community-based governance, a system
that has emerged in the context of open source software (OSS), development communities with
decentralized contribution schemes. The typical stakeholder structure of open source projects is
analogous to many cryptocurrencies, and can help parse which contributors should and can have
the rights to the decision rights structure. As Siobhan O’Mahony (2007) notes, although the term
open source software (OSS) seems to implicate free access for contributors, most successful OSS
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projects have structured governance systems, including formal leadership roles, representative
decision making, and funding from nonprofit foundations (140). This governance structure
mirrors closely the relationship between developers, users, and miners in the cryptocurrency
stakeholder infrastructure. At a high level, the intricacy of governance in OSS implies a similar
structure could be required for cryptocurrency given the task of balancing multiple contributors,
and indicates that the behavioral components of governance.
As governance theory predicts, the structures of governance in OSS stem directly from
contributor incentives. For example, most OSS encourages development from multiple sources
but restricts access to the code base, usually to only founding members or “executives”;
structuring levels of restricted membership around joint production serves to limit a singular
actor’s interest in the scope of the larger community (147). Decision-making authority in
community governance is thus sometimes constructed in a hierarchy from community-approved
improvements to complex code level decisions (147). Sonali K. Shah’s (2006) research on
hybrid OSS development similarly finds that the governance structure of a system affects
participation (1000). In addition to decision rights, Shah also found that property rights and
ownership of information remained crucial to initiating buy in, noting “the creation of a neutral
and accessible commons is crucial for fostering community-based innovation” in the absence of
face to face relationships (1011). The neutrality of the commons is constructed by the
governance system and its managers in order to curb opportunism. Yochai Benkler (2003), a
renowned scholar in the field of internet governance, notes that social systems “tremendous
investment, acculturation, and maintenance” (110). He described that “social transactional
frameworks are likely to be substantially less expensive than market transactions for pooling
large number of discrete, small increments of the excess capacity from the perspective of the
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contributors” (116). He also characterized two key components of peer sharing models:
modularity, the property of a project that describes the extent to which it can be broken down
into smaller components that can be independently produced before assembled; and granularity,
the size modules in terms of the time and effort that an individual must invest in producing them
(110). This mirrors the way that individuals approach work in the firm, by the size and effort
required to earn incentive. Community based governance in OSS has no clear superordinate goal
unless imposed by its participants, and thus requires intrinsic motivation for participation, rather
than financial incentive. Rather than removing the need for trust, this in fact increases the
strength of relationships among people on the network whose shared interest is entirely
voluntary.
Thus, OSS exemplifies the impact of technology on traditional theories of governance. It
decreases communication and search costs among actors and facilitates decentralized joint
production for outputs that are separable. Communities that are able to forge trust-based
relationships through repeated interaction and reputation thrive despite lacking typical
transacting relationships. Decision rights in the absence of physical community takes on a new
level of heightened awareness for relationship-building. The implication for open source
software is despite the ability to work in a decentralized manner, governance structures are still
richly visible to underlie the technical infrastructure. In the end, it appears that technology does
not eliminate the need for governance as long as joint contributions are the key outcome. Since
actors are always innovating to increase their position relative to a firm, the behavioral basis for
their actions surrounding joint production seem to necessitate some form of governance, an idea
that will be explored further in the analysis of cryptocurrency.
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ANALYSIS
Bitcoin
As the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin introduced the typical system of technical governance
described in the introduction. This section will examine the non-technical attributes of the
current governance structure of Bitcoin, through the lens of incentive structures and decision
rights of the major participants. In order to analyze the incentive structures within governance of
Bitcoin, this paper will primarily look at the two stakeholder groups with the largest amounts of
power, developers and miners, while also giving a brief overview of the influence potential of
external groups and users.
Developers hold a range of incentives for participating in the Bitcoin network: some
developers view their contributions to Bitcoin as volunteer work, while others are sponsored by
private businesses to take part (Wirdum 2016). This follows Benkler’s analysis that because opt
in for open source projects is entirely voluntary, the choice to contribute is colored by intangible
gains from a social transaction, such as social standing and recognition (96). Bitcoin does not
establish a strict hierarchy of contributing developers, which seems to be common practice in
OSS, but the system does differentiate between the incentive structures for ordinary contributors
and core developers. Core developers have the distinction of holding the Bitcoin source code,
and are seen as both the de facto internal and external leaders of the organization (BitcoinCore
2018, “Team”). Core developers on the Bitcoin system are tasked with improving its software.
As stated on the official Bitcoin Foundation website developers “can’t force a change in protocol
because all users are free to choose what software and version they use. In order to stay
compatible with each other, all users need to use software complying with the same rules.
Bitcoin can only work correctly with a complete consensus among all users” (Bitcoin.org 2018,
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“FAQ”). Thus, core developers hold “commit access” to merge new software proposals that
invoke community agreement with the system. They are compensated through the Bitcoin
Foundation, a nonprofit entity that “coordinates the efforts of the members of the Bitcoin
community, helping to create awareness of the benefits of Bitcoin, how to use it and its related
technology requirements, for technologists, regulators, the media and everyone else globally”
(The Bitcoin Foundation 2018, “About” ). Modeled off of the Linux Foundation, a nonprofit
corporation that supports the development of many open source projects, the Bitcoin Foundation
engages in activities such as organizing conferences, funding protocol development, political
lobbying, and administering research grants (The Bitcoin Foundation 2018, “About”). It chiefly
deals with developers, and follows Nakamoto’s original goals closely in order to promote
creative development to further the currency. Contributing developers are often well known in
OSS, and are not explicitly contracted anywhere on the platform; as mentioned above, most are
externally compensated, if at all.
The governance structure within the Bitcoin Foundation has also undergone tumultuous
change, with many directors quitting and the Foundation declaring bankruptcy on multiple
occasions since its inception in 2009. As a result, Bitcoin Foundation has since sought more
consistent funding from a few primary sources, among them the MIT Digital Currency Initiative,
an interdisciplinary research laboratory that intends to provide a neutral academic working
environment for developers, to fund their salaries. The organization employs core developers to
further research into blockchain and applications to financial inclusions, and other technology
companies that have a stake in the improvement of blockchain (Wirdum). For example,
Blockstream, a for-profit technology company, employs developers in Bitcoin. To align their
incentives, Blockstream developers have time-locked Bitcoins to ensure they are incentivized to
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work toward Bitcoin’s success. Their contracts also include “morality clauses”: if Blockstream
asks any of them to work against what they consider to be in Bitcoin’s best interest, they can
refuse to do so while still guaranteed a salary (Wirdum) Rather than putting up a significant
amount of money to fund development, the Initiative relies on compiling unrestricted gifts from
sponsors, such as mining experts and high net worth individuals, who may in turn be funded by
venture capitalists and other larger institutional investors (Wirdum). In order to combat the
perceived conflict of interest, the developers are said to have complete freedom over their work,
including retaining the ability to research alternative currency implementations (e.g. a core
developer named Gavin Andresen’s work and proposal for a hard fork of Bitcoin came out of his
efforts in paid research at the Initiative) (Wirdum). These systems seem to curb systematic
opportunism among developers, although the implications of doing “research” on blockchain
does not necessarily always align with the time sensitive code decisions core developers are
often tasked to make. Thus the Bitcoin Foundation appears to be accepting of any type of
development in the area of Bitcoin improvement, regardless of whEther developers are working
toward their own motivations or toward the betterment of the specific system.
Unlike the majority of the Bitcoin network that remains decentralized (both spatially and
computationally), the core developers of Bitcoin seem to retain close knit ties. The few who have
the privilege of holding commit access do seem to have rampant opportunities to act in their own
self interest; however, the balance of core developers on the system ensures that malicious action
taken by any single developer would immediate result in his or her expulsion and a revocation of
their commit access (Lombrozo 2017) For example, Gavin Andresen’s continued attempts to
initiate forks led the core development team to remove his access rights because they believed he
was not acting to the benefit of the Bitcoin community.
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The use of the Bitcoin Foundation to coordinate the funding for Bitcoin also calls into
question the purpose and the typical governance structures of nonprofit foundations. In effect,
nonprofits’ purposes are inherently non-monetary; as a result, trust, intrinsic motivation, and
strong networks are the biggest drivers of nonprofit actions. Centered around mission and
ideology, nonprofits do not typically rely on stakeholder incentives. This insinuates that a
potential power overreach by, for example, members of the board of the Bitcoin Foundation might
have disruptive consequences in that the system itself is built on trust while the surrounding
technology deliberately avoid these networks.
Much like contributing developers, the users of Bitcoin encompass a wide variety of
individuals who buy into the currency with different purposes. Investors in Bitcoin are often
individuals, rather than institutions, and have shown to be predominantly male (Leinz 2018).
Crucially, a strong investing pool in Bitcoin occurs from non-technology oriented, libertarian
groups that believe in the power of Bitcoin as an alternative to traditional government issued
currency (Leinz). It can be inferred that users also buy into Bitcoin in order to profit off of the
growth of the technology. Recent developments have also allowed the trade of Bitcoin financial
instruments on the market, leading a wider variety of people to become exposed to the volatility
of the currency. The composition of ownership in Bitcoin varies, but it is well known that several
individuals hold a significant proportion of the currency (e.g. the Winklevoss twins and
Nakamoto) (Pollack 2017). Users contribute to the governance of Bitcoin primarily through
online message boards, where many users have developed significant discourse surrounding
important issues related to Bitcoin, including the fork (Bitcoin.org, “Community”).
In contrast to the visibility of many developers in Bitcoin, miners’ identities are
necessarily shrouded in secrecy; they comprise diverse communities of programmers across the
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world (Bitcoin Magazine, “What is Bitcoin Mining?”) . As stated previously, miners have two
primary functions within the Bitcoin ecosystem: to approve transactions and to mine new coins.
Miners are incentivized by compensation from each of those two activities: receiving transaction
fees from transactors and by holding coins as a store of value. Most Bitcoin miners view it as a
full time job, and owing to systematic differences between types of cryptocurrency, they
typically only mine Bitcoin, or Bitcoin offshoots called altcoins (Bitcoin Magazine, “What is An
Altcoin?”) In examining whEther miner incentives are aligned with that of Bitcoin as a whole,
most attention will be directed to these two forms of compensation, and whEther they are
mutually satisfying for miner goals.
The rise of mining pools, or coordinated groups of miners that split the benefits of mining
equally among themselves, poses several problems for the technical integrity of the system (Eyal
and Sirer 2013, 437). Mining pools have arisen in order to combine hashrate power amongst
groups of individuals to be able to receive the highest transaction fees and mine the greatest
number of blocks (437). There are several distinct advantages to mining in pools: it results in
guaranteed payments; it results in a greater concentration of payments, because the combined
hashrate speed ensures that the pool will mine more coins; finally, miners in third party pools do
not need to be connected to the entire Bitcoin blockchain, a factor that tends to make their
processing feeds much more quick (StackExchange 2014, “How do mining pools work?”). . The
third party miners are connected to the Bitcoin network through the administrator of the pool,
who functions as a full Bitcoin node (StackExchange 2014, “How do mining pools work?”). .
Administrators solve metering and shirking potential amongst members within the mining pool
by having them solve a hash that is not nearly as difficult as it would be on the network. This
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ensures that miners will work to mine new blocks in third party entities (StackExchange 2014,
“How do mining pools work?”).
The rapid concentration of power in Bitcoin puts the network at risk for intentioned miner
attacks due to the attractiveness of opting into pools. Mining pools have also effectively made it
impossible to mine as an individual; as pools become the predominant source of mining, power
concentrates in the hands of few organizations that could undermine the system due to competing
interests. Mining pools are responsible for mining and synthesizing new blocks of transactions;
thus, their acceptance of rules is essential in order that the new types of blocks and transactions
can actually be added to the blockchain. As Benkler notes, “The number of people who can, in
principle participate in a project is therefore inversely related to the size of the smallest-scale
contribution necessary to produce a usable module”, indicating that as the crucial function of
mining becomes more important and require a larger investment of time, the universe of
potential miners decreases, leading to increased accumulation of power in mining pools (101). In
addition to aggregating computing power, miners can also cause adverse effects on the system
itself through pools. Conti, Lal, and Ruj (2017) identify eight different types of major attacks on
the PoW based consensus protocol in Bitcoin that are amplified by mining pools. These include:
double spending, or spending the same bitcoins on multiple transactions; privately mining on
blockchain fork; and block withholding attacks. Many of the types of attacks are facilitated by
mining pools in order to drive individual minors and to weaken the consensus protocol of PoW
(Eyal and Sirer 438). The types of attacks that mining pools can conduct are more lethal if they
accumulate a majority of the hashrate on the network, which would contradict Nakamoto’s
vision that miner attacks would be safeguarded through distributed governance. Recent data
indicates that 65% of the hashrate of the Bitcoin network is contained by five dominant mining
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cartels, increasing the chance of malicious activity (Rosic 2018). The question then becomes:
why haven’t these pools launched a coordinated attack? While there have not been any definitive
answers for why that is the case, one widely speculated explanation is that attacks would provide
power only in a limited time frame. The long term implications of a 51% attack might include
being shunned from the system by other members and tanking the price of the cryptocurrency,
which could have adverse effect on the selfish miners. (Eyal and Sirer 452) In a sense this poses
a transaction cost for malicious mining. To prevent these types of attacks, core developers of
Bitcoin have been relatively successful in the guidance they provide through the Bitcoin
Foundations to users through the community; Gavin Andresen has written to urge miners to
transfer to smaller, decentralized mining pools, which might in fact result in higher PoW costs
for miners (Cawrey 2014). In articles and commentary surrounding Bitcoin, many appeal to
“Bitcoin purists” who should act for the integrity of the network, regardless of the cost structures
in place (Bitcoin.org, “Community”). Thus, it seems that the ideology of Bitcoin has been
successful in preventing power overreach.
Mining pools seem to arise because of the combined hashrate power they provide in
block creation (Eyal and Sirer 437). Meanwhile, these pools demonstrate a more formalized
governance system. The structure of mining pools itself implies a single residual claimant who
distributes coins to participants according to the work they contribute. The behavior of this single
person is unregulated, except through implicit contracting within the pool, and yet this individual
holds a significant amount of power in the way that money is produced in the system, which
underlies almost all actions that can be taken on it and any transactions that can be conducted. In
effect, miners have established a centralized system, having internally determined that the cost of
metering is far less than the aggregate power acquired from having a monitor.
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Miners’ second mode of compensation is through transaction fees that are added on top
of any coin transaction between two users at the discretion of the initiating party. The fees are
not standardized and comprise a wide range that correlates to the value of the transaction to the
transacting party. This poses a significant problem for the future of the Bitcoin ecosystem for
two primary reasons: first, that it gives miners inordinate control over the system, and second,
because it subverts Nakamoto’s intentions for Bitcoin. If miners are compensated for the tasks
that underlie the system, they can effectively choose which transactions to complete based on the
fee attached, resulting in increasingly high transaction fees in order to use the system. There is
evidence that this is already happening; transaction with low fees are known to suffer from
starvation, when miners deny the transaction service because the opportunity cost of other
transactions is too high (Conti et. al. 4). Given that Nakamoto advocated for Bitcoin to solve the
issue of paying third party processors for transactions, it seems antithetical to the system itself
that transaction fees will be a valid mode of compensation for miners moving forward.
Furthermore, because the block size is fixed, transactions will naturally become expensive, and
limit user profitability in the types of payments a few types of transactions such as settlement
transactions between financial intermediaries, while transactions representing everyday
purchases will get pushed off the main network into “side chains” or off-chain payment
channels, and ultimately become more obscure (Conti et al. 32).
Miners’ incentives to create new coins when the overall money supply has a finite
capacity presents another conundrum. Specifically the present and future interests of miners
differ significantly. Present miners are focused on creating coins as quickly as possible in order
reap maximal financial benefits. This is the dominant and necessary strategy because there is
limited upside potential for miners due to the PoW mechanism becoming more and more
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difficult every 2 weeks. Furthermore, the number of newly mined coins that are rewarded halves
every 210,000 blocks (bitcoinwiki 2017, “Protocol rules”). However, future miners, as the
supply of money nears its cap, will be more focused on transaction fees and will have little
incentive to take on mining as a full time activity. The lower incentives could result in lower
difficulty than what the public desires from a security perspective, and might compromise the
integrity of the system. This problem, defined by the economic conundrum “Tragedy of the
Commons”, is an example of how bounded rationality manifests in Bitcoin, and has been widely
regarded as a major threat facing the community (bitcoinwiki 2015, “Tragedy of the
Commons”).
The second key area of analysis within governance of cryptocurrency is the structure of
decision making. Decision rights in the Bitcoin framework take on two primary functions: code
changes and code forks. Code change approval requires developers to have control over a source
code repository, and is enacted by core developers. This mechanism was controlled by
Nakamoto, and subsequently by Gavin Andresen (after Nakamoto stepped down in 2011)
(Simonite 2014). These privileges now lie in the hands of Bitcoin’s four major developers, who
are entrusted with major administrative rights (De Filippi and Loveluck 6). Code change occurs
at the discretion of these individuals; however, any Bitcoin or external stakeholder can submit a
Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP), a design document for introducing features or information
to Bitcoin that provides technical specifications of the feature and rationale for its
implementation (bitcoinwiki, “Bitcoin Improvement Proposals”). There are three primary types
of BIPs: standards track BIPs, informational BIPs, and process BIPs. Standards track BIPs are
generally the most impactful in the changes proposed and require community consensus. After
core developers approve and consolidate the BIPs, they will put the proposal out to the

32

community; all members of the community (users, contributing developers, miners) have the
opportunitiy to comment on it. The final vote is made primarily by miners who operate full
functioning nodes by including a small piece of “voting code” in the blocks that they mine
through PoW. The results are then broadcasted and then accepted or rejected. Generally, BIPs
will achieve community approval before reaching the level of critical decision-making, which is
examined in further detail in a later discussion on forks. The BIP process requires that all source
code and documentation be released and made available to anyone, so that the entire community
of individuals can discuss and improve them with subsequent proposals (De Filippi and
Loveluck 2016, 13). The BIP process exemplifies the use of technology to minimize governance,
although the ultimate enactment of the code change is put in the hands of core developers.
Bitcoin has experienced several forks that draw attention to the unique consensus
formation it employs. Specifically, although the fork itself is created by software and ideological
divergences among developers, miners ultimately choose what system to work on, analogous to
“veto power” in shareholder votes. As explained by De Filippi and Loveluck, Bitcoin’s first fork,
Bitcoin XT, occurred because of ideological differences on optimal block size: the limited block
size of 1 MB allowed for the system to be stable and secure, but limited the number of
transactions that could be processed at any given time (11). In addition to slowing transaction
speeds for users, the block size also limited the upside potential of mining rewards, which,
according to fork proponents, prevented the currency as a whole from scaling effectively (11).
Those against block size increase cited the inclusivity and decentralization of the original
proposed system as threatened because of the greater computing power needed to produce on
larger blocks. According to some cryptographers, the increase in block size would also
compromise the security of the network and delays in confirmation times (11). In August 2015,
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two core developers of Bitcoin, Mike Hearn and Gavin Andresen, released Bitcoin XT, a
variation of the Bitcoin software that increased the block size to 8 MB (roughly 24 transactions
per second), with the cap on block size expected to double every two years (11). The system
would require that 75% of 1,000 of the most recently mined blocks to be attributed to a system
with the new block size (11). The new types of signature on Bitcoin XT would constitute a
system that was then incompatible with the original Bitcoin. Bitcoin XT was well received upon
its launch, and was run by 1,000 nodes. The controversy surrounding the launch of Bitcoin XT,
including online attacks and censorship of Bitcoin XT supporters within the Bitcoin community,
ultimately led to low adoption rates among users and miners, and forced Hearn to resign in the
wake of its failure. Andresen withdrew the XT BIP when it became clear that the currency was
not going to gain acceptance over the original Bitcoin protocol, now termed Bitcoin Core, and its
functionality was near dead by early 2016. This began a series of forks, including Bitcoin Classic
in February 2016, which increased the block size to 2 MB to aim for a more market driven
approach , and Bitcoin Unlimited (12).
As discussions about how and if Bitcoin should scale came to a head in late 2015, a
second proposal, termed Segregated Witness (SegWit), was made by several core developers as a
compromise to the increase in block size. SegWit would increase the effective block size by
reducing the size of each individual transaction, a soft fork in Bitcoin Core rather than a hard
fork (Torpey 2017). The decrease in transaction size would come from the removal of digital
signatures that comprised over 60% of the entire Bitcoin blockchain. The first Segwit soft fork
was approved almost universally by 95% of miners and activated in August 2017 (Torpey).
However subsequent SegWit2x hard forks faced low approval from miners who faced very high
opportunity costs from switching to the system (roughly the difference between mining fewer but
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higher value blocks vs. more, lower value blocks) (Torpey). This was also because SegWit2x
was capped at a 2GB blocksize (a seemingly arbitrary number), and due to difficulties in
signaling actually indicating miner votes (Torpey).
Miner incentives within the decision to fork perhaps hold the greatest capacity to diverge
from the overall good of the currency. For one, under Williamson’s theory, multiple Bitcoin
forks lower switching and search costs for miners to seek rewards. This upside is also realized
almost exclusively by mining pools: because the underlying hash algorithm for most Bitcoin
altcoins is the same in all proposed forks, mining pools experience low switching costs, and will
mine whichever currency is offering the highest potential reward at a given time. These profit
switching mining pools both capture a significant amount of value across all currencies and also
further push individual miners out of the system. Thus, mining pools have incentive to distort
signaling effects, and keep as many coins in the market as possible. The precedent introduced by
the first Bitcoin fork in 2015 has led to greater instability within the currency to find the optimal
software, which also continually places miners in advantageous bargaining positions. The
tradeoff between security and block size also strongly favors mining pools and makes the entire
system more subject to selfish miner attacks and further manipulation.
The interplay between users and miners forms another basis for decision rights. In effect,
miners’ consideration to signal for a fork is a function of the added complexity of the fork and
user support. User support is largely determined by strong trust networks within the Bitcoin
community. It is no accident that forks have been initiated by core developers, whose visibility
and reputation enable trust more easily than external actors. Users are in turn influenced by
external stakeholders, such as crypto focused funds and financial instruments that speculate
about the currency. Meanwhile, because users often have less stake and knowledge of the
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system, they tend to be risk averse against token volatility. Ultimately, if miners signal for a
change on the system, greater community acceptance in using Bitcoin on the new system
determine its “success”.
The conditions for trust according to Williamson/Dasgupta were as follows: individuals must
have repeated encounters and memory of previous experiences; there must be a cost to honest
behavior; and finally, reputation must have stake within the system, (466).
In sum, Bitcoin’s technical infrastructure aims to eliminate third parties and complex
transaction costs that are associated with bureaucratic elements of payment processing. Among
the potential powers of the actors in the system, miners and developers hold the greatest capacity
for opportunism, with miners forming powerful coalitions to dominate the computing power of
the network and developers, especially those in the core and sponsored by the Bitcoin
Foundation, gaining the ability to push their own personal vision of Bitcoin due to their high
profile. Within decision rights, this may manifest in miners signaling votes for software changes
that may not benefit the overall system. However, exempting the Bitcoin hard fork, the nontechnical governance of the system has been relatively stable. Relationships between individuals,
especially among core developers and with the user and mining communities virtually, seem to
form the basis of decision making in the absence of formal governance.
Ethereum
The largest successor cryptocurrency that has emerged to Bitcoin is Ethereum, an opensource public software platform that utilizes blockchain technology, and an independent
cryptotoken, Ether. Ethereum’s own governance structure can be analyzed through examining its
history as a direct descendant of Bitcoin, the incentives and decision rights systems it employs,
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and two important historical events on the network: the movement to Proof of Stake (PoS)
mining and the highly publicized hacking of “the DAO”.
Ethereum was first conceptualized in 2013 by Vitalik Buterin, an active developer in the
Bitcoin community, who strove to apply blockchain technology to the creation of decentralized
applications (Hertig). Its mission and goals are markedly different from that of Bitcoin. The
creation of Ethereum reflected Buterin’s belief that Bitcoin’s technical infrastructure was
underutilized. Specifically, in his landmark 2013 White Paper, Buterin proposed Ethereum as
“the ultimate abstract foundational layer” that would allow users greater functionality in creating
autonomous organizations, applications, and automatically executable contracts (Ethereum
White Paper). The promise of Ethereum is thus centered around its functionality as a platform,
rather than as a currency system.
Ethereum employs a system of “smart contracts”, or digital assets that are controlled by a
single piece of code when certain conditions (e.g. contractual obligations) are met (Ethereum
White Paper). Buterin envisioned smart contracts as “autonomous agents” that lived within the
Ethereum execution environment (Ethereum White Paper). The notion of smart contracts was
first described by Nick Szabo in the late 1990s as a “proactively enforced form”, much like a
vending machine that delivers an easily defined product for a specific amount of cash (Szabo
1997, 1). In short, smart contracts would ensure that all parties would not be able to change the
terms of the contract once executed. The development of Ethereum accelerated after the
foundation of smart contracts. In 2014, Gavin Wood, a computer science PhD who had
researched blockchain, published the Ethereum Yellow Paper to further hone the technical
specifications of the project. Wood introduced yet another dimension, termed Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM), the runtime environment for Ether, and translated the first functional
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implementation into seven programming languages (Wood 2015, 11). In structuring Ethereum as
such, Wood and Buterin aimed to create a widely accessible platform for developers, which they
hoped would cultivate a large community of like-minded followers.
As described in the Ethereum White Paper from 2015, which was initially authored by
Buterin and has since been continuously updated and modified, Ethereum employs a technical
system that resembles Bitcoin’s blockchain, but with several significant differences. Ethereum
itself is made up of units, termed “accounts”, that can engage in “state transitions”, or transfers
of value and information. This differs from Bitcoin, which utilizes unspent transaction outputs
(UTXO) to conduct payments. The cryptotoken and source of value within Ethereum is termed
“Ether”; Buterin envisioned Ether as a “fuel” for the system that powered internal transactions,
rather than a distinct currency. He proposed two general types of accounts: externally owned
accounts, which could execute only transactions; and contract accounts, which could be encoded
to send transactions or create contracts. In addition to the sending and receiving address, each
Ethereum transaction would contain specifications regarding the amount of Ether “gas” required
to execute the transaction, as well as the fee to miners associated with the transaction. Unlike
Bitcoin, where transaction fees are attached voluntarily to transactions to be processed, Ethereum
would require fees to compensate miners for each execution on the network. The amount of gas
associated with a transaction from an externally owned account (a non contractual account)
would be directly correlated to the number of computational steps required for miners and users
to complete the transaction, usually through the size of the transaction in bytes; this represents
another departure from Bitcoin, where transaction fees are not required. Similarly, messages that
originate from contract accounts could “call” another contract account, allowing different
contracts to activate one another depending on the type of transaction desired. The amount of gas
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specified for messages between contract accounts would extend over all desired actions begun on
the chain. The contract’s code could either be run to completion or until the execution ran out of
gas. From start to finish, a transaction would be first verified to make sure it had all necessary
components, before a miner could transfer the transaction value from the sender’s account to the
receiver’s while taking a transaction fee. All remaining fees in excess of the amount necessary to
execute the transaction would refunded to the seller. At every step of the process, the amount of
gas from the sender would be required to be equal to or greater than the amount needed to
generate the transaction, or the system will throw an error. This also ensures safety from double
spending, and ensures every action is paid for before it is conducted.
The EVM also allows developers to execute at the code level. All Ethereum contracts are
written in low-level stack-based bytecode language that can access account information on the
Ethereum network. As such, Ethereum is classified as Turing Complete, which ensures that any
type of code can be executed on the blockchain. At its inception, Buterin envisioned Ethereum
mining as PoW much like Bitcoin, but the system has since transitioned to proof-of-stake (PoS),
which is described in further detail below. Regardless, the blockchain in Ethereum is similar to
that of Bitcoin: each block is checked by miners to ensure that the timestamp precedes the new
transaction and that the PoW/PoS is valid. However, Ethereum stores all state information within
a block, removing the need for the blockchain to store all history of the chain, saving both data
and space. Transactions and contracts are both executed in blocks (Ethereum White Paper).
Thus, Buterin conceptualized Ethereum as an improvement to Bitcoin that utilized different
types of opportunities on blockchain’s technical interface. Buterin’s ideas have since been hailed
as successes: currently, Ethereum is trading at over $600, and has the second largest market
share of all cryptocurrencies after Bitcoin (Ethereumprice.org)
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In light of corporate governance theory surrounding the optimal use of contracting, it is
interesting to consider the ways in which smart contracts successfully subvert the main barriers
commonly held to contracting. Almost paradoxically, the system of smart contracts expects
immutable transactions to be executed by those without clearly defined roles. Contracting,
according to corporate governance theory, is most useful when specifying specific transactions
only because the cost of contracting is so high. Smart contracts eliminate most of the costs
involved with enforcing contracts by having those costs programmed into the contract’s
existence. This form of technical governance eliminates costs associated with decision rights, as
it quickly compiles data from multiple users and takes actions on the network without any need
for outside influence.
Ethereum has many potential applications that arise from the functionality of smart
contracts, including tokens, financial derivatives, and decentralized autonomous organizations
(DAOs). The latter is perhaps one of the most novel uses of blockchain. The Ethereum White
Paper defines DAOs as virtual entities that have a shareholder base, and can facilitate votes
among this base to change its code. A simple version of a DAO might include code that alters
itself if a certain percentage of shareholders (e.g. 51% or 67%) vote for the alteration. For
example, Bitcoin is considered a fully functional DAO because it has a preprogrammed set of
rules and functions autonomously through a distributed consensus protocol (CoinTelegraph,
“What is DAO”). The code might include different levels of transactions that assign certain votes
to shareholders, register votes in favor, and to finalize proposals once the vote count hits the
desired total. Each of these actions would be represented as a clause in the contract, with each
clause storing a history of changes. Additional features of DAOs could allow shareholders to add
and remove members or buy and sell shares.
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DAOs are funded through open investment; the rationale for investing in a DAO varies,
but often investors interested in the premise of a DAO buy in to acquire voting rights and to
influence operations (CoinTelegraph). Once deployed, a DAO is autonomous from its founders
and any people; it operates on a microscale like a cryptocurrency that makes decisions only
based on consensus and a rigid proposal process. It is worth noting that DAOs themselves cannot
create products and do require system upkeep, usually through a “contractor” (often a founder),
and immediately voted upon by investors. Creators of DAOs experience similar incentives to buy
into technology that they aligns with their own ideology. An analysis of “The DAO”, a DAO
that received widespread public attention due to issues of governance and hacking is presented
below in further discussions on decision rights. In sum, DAOs represent a technical governance
system built on smart contracts that operate independently from human control.
The governance of Ethereum mirrors the general structure of Bitcoin with a nonprofit
foundation, developers, miners, and users. However there are distinctive differences in the
composition of Ethereum within these structures. For one, the Ethereum Foundation seems to
hold significant power over the direction of the currency due to its creation preceding the
existence of Ethereum itself. According to its official historical documentation, Ethereum was
released in a coordinated presale in order to both fund ongoing development and establish a
network of developers, miners, investors (Ethereum Homestead 2016, “History of Ethereum”).
The legal complexities of the presale led to the creation of the Ethereum Foundation, a nonprofit
headquartered in Switzerland that facilitated the sale; the profits of the sale went toward the legal
fees associated with creating the Ethereum Foundation as well as prior uncompensated developer
fees. The sale was based in Bitcoin, and netted over 50 million Ether, which was about $18
million at the time (Ethereum Homestead). The involvement of the Ethereum Foundation in the
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creation of Ethereum as an individual entity implies that the Foundation’s agenda, which is
shaped primarily by core developers, holds precedence over the development of the system. This
seems to indicate that entities that formed Ethereum are staked because they have a specific
vision for its future. The Ethereum Foundation thus constitutes a more typical firm shareholding
model, with the holders of Ether actively buying into the system and distributed ownership
across a range of individuals and institutions, rather than coordinated through a singular third
party. This represents a departure from the Bitcoin Foundation, which is independently funded.
The Foundation also issues grants to developers in order to incentivize them utilize the system,
indicating that the developers that use the system may be less intrinsically motivated toward a
common goal. It is worth noting that there are some external funding sources that buy Ether to
invest in the novel technical premise. Recently, the Ethereum Foundation has fielded donations
from dubious sources including a Russian state bank (O’Leary 2017, ‘Misunderstanding’: Vitalik
Buterin to Create New Entity for Russian Bank Deal.). The use of these sources indicate that it
might be possible for actors external to Ethereum to influence the ideological direction that the
Foundation chooses to implement through its developer grants.
Due to its developer friendly,open-run environment, Ethereum has attracted a wide array
of developers with different motivations that hope to utilize and build upon Ethereum’s many
potential applications. The barriers to entry to create an application on Ethereum’s network are
quite low, which incentivizes a greater range of potential participant developers to use the system
(Github.com/go-Ethereum 2017, “Developer’s Guide”). As a result, more developers use
Ethereum than any other cryptocurrency (Keys 2018). Furthermore, the broad, exploration
oriented mission of Ethereum ensures that the developers who join the system retain nearly
autonomous creative control. While this has spawned a diverse set of applications, it also
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indicates that developers are not necessarily united toward a common purpose; for example,
widely varied implementations have sometimes been criticized by experienced developers as
marketed deliberately to uneducated developers and have led to many unfinished projects (Breen
2018). Many prominent academic computer scientists have come out against the logic that is
required on the Ethereum system that makes it vulnerable to security threats, precisely because it
attempts to allow for multiple implementations of applications (Russell 2017). Most recently, a
temporary bug in the Ethereum system trapped hundreds of millions of dollars in the system, to
users’ detriment (Russell). There seems to be a tradeoff between overall system effectiveness,
and the ability to distribute technical and creative control across multiple individuals, leading to
security concerns. The lack of governance toward developers in Ethereum may thus have
unintentional negative consequences for the technical wellbeing of the currency.
Just as developer interest in Ethereum is wide ranging, user incentives to participate in
Ethereum are also more varied. Users on the Ethereum system hold Ether tokens, vote on DAO
proposals in the network, and utilize smart contracts for immutability in payments. They tend to
be more technology oriented than the average Bitcoin user because the decentralized applications
they opt into on the Ethereum system are worth Ether investment primarily for voting rights:
knowledge of what technical changes to make and to operate in a DAO, for example, would lead
to better and more rational decision making than an uninformed person (Olpinski 2016). Users of
Ethereum also tend not to own other types of cryptocurrency, especially Bitcoin; their support is
usually ideological and unilateral. There are no Ethereum instruments currently trading in the
financial markets, but they will presumably come into being given the SEC’s approval, giving
Ethereum further exposure to external actors.
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Miner incentives in Ethereum have shifted since the inception of the currency. They
originally faced a similar circumstance to Bitcoin while utilizing PoW; however, the shift toward
a PoS system from PoW has fundamentally changed the role of mining. According to the
Ethereum website, PoS is a consensus algorithm that depends on the actor’s economic stake in
the network1. While PoW uses the speed at which miners can solve cryptographic puzzles as a
method to designate which miner is compensated for the transaction and to create new coins, PoS
uses a more complex system of voting amongst miners that depends on the size of their Ether
stake. PoS was proposed in order to combat the inherent problems with PoW that Bitcoin had
come to exemplify: the rise of mining pools predisposed the network to a 51% attack, the energy
consumption required to mine prohibited individuals from entering the system to prevent further
mining pools. While Ethereum had originally used a PoW system, Buterin had always expressed
desire to transition to PoS; the Ethereum community was largely supportive of the shift, as many
problems, especially coordinated miner attacks, had come to light surrounding PoW
(Github.com/go-Ethereum, “Proof-Of-Stake_FAQs”). Currently, Ethereum employs a variant of
the Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) type of PoS that was released as “The Casper Protocol” in
October 2017 (Buterin and Griffith 2017). Ethereum as a whole is thus more conscious of the
potential for miners to accumulate power, and strives to minimize it.
Casper was envisioned as a security-deposit based consensus protocol that required
miners to buy into Ether in order to paricipate. Buterin and Griffith proposed that Casper would
help mitigate some of the main problems with the existing iteration of PoS, specifically the
“Nothing at Stake” problem, and “long range attacks”. The Nothing at Stake problem resulted
from properties of the PoS algorithm that specified both the stake and random frequency of
success; in effect it incentivized miners to mine on every possible chain, and with enough of a
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majority, could have led to miners coordinating forks in order to send and receive coins
themselves. Long-range attacks occured when miners attempted to start a fork that was very far
back on the chain, in order to replicate the entire blockchain; this confused participants because it
led them to question which chain was technically “valid” (Li 2017). In essence, PoS required a
trusted source for the initial blockchain data to avoid replication. Casper eliminated both of these
key issues through mechanisms that forced miners to form consensus blockchains, translating to
miner activity becoming further restricted and removing much of the potential for miner power
overreach.
The role of miners was impacted by the shift to PoS because of the need for miners a
superior stake, rather than superior computing power, to retain a competitive advantage. PoS
constructs a system where miners bet their security deposits on a blockchain based on how they
expect everyone else to bet their deposits; the consensus derived from this bet creates the
“objective” blockchain, and ensures that there will be a single chain that miners use. Miners first
mine to discover blocks, and then attempt to validate the block by placing a bet on it; if and when
the block gets appended, then miners receive a reward proportionate to their bets (A. Kiayias et
al. 258). If they bet correctly, they earn their deposit back through fixed transaction fees and
token issuance (A. Kiayias et al. 2017, 258). Miners are thus incentivized to bet correctly
because they would otherwise lose their deposit, lessening the stake and their potential to mine in
the future(A. Kiayias et al. 258) . This game theory approach ensures that through multiple
rounds of betting, miner bets eventually converge to the “true” chain. Coordinated hard forks by
a collusion of miners could be reversed by the remainder of the community moving to the “true”
chain; furthermore, the extensive supply of Ether necessary to fund an attack would inevitably
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cause the currency value to increase. Thus, the primary role of miners in Ethereum is to approve
the execution of the transaction, rather than its contents.
The transition to PoS has many important implications for miners. Because success is tied
to the amount of Ether miners have, the alignment between the overall goals of Ethereum and
successful validation is more salient, as it would seem counterproductive for a miner to sabotage
a system in which their stake was reliant on the value of that system. This seems to reflect
O’Mahony’s argument that the presence of property rights increases the buy in of economic
actors in OSS. However, while the system is designed to curtail the rise of mining pools, it
increases the wealth of individual miners by ensuring that the richest ones will continue to
receive the benefits of validation. This would, over time, decrease the speed of block validation,
even as the number of transactions per second on the Ethereum network increases exponentially.
Because individual miners hold a great deal of power on the system, and because power is
correlated to stake size, there is very little incentive for new miners to enter. Thus while PoS
ensures that the system overall will be manipulated less easily by coalitions of miners, it makes
individual miners more powerful instead. Over time, this could cause problems for Ethereum, as
fewer miners will be incentivized the join the system and slow transaction speed and use.
Meanwhile, the presence of fixed transaction fees that are proportional to the size and
complexity of the transaction could eventually lead to transaction starvation for smaller
payments, as has occurred in Bitcoin.
Because of the inherent structure of DAOs, decision rights in Ethereum are inextricably
bound to the incentives for various actors, as the greatest influence an actor can wield is through
voting power. Code changes and forks also comprise the majority of decision thus far for
Ethereum. Much like in Bitcoin, code changes in Ethereum occur through formal Ethereum
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improvement proposals (EIPs) that require community consensus. Because of the multifaceted
nature of the Ethereum system, there are many more types of proposals, including those that are
application specific and “Meta” EIPs that formalize the processes themselves (Ethereum.org,
“Ethereum Improvement Proposals”). This in itself indicates a meta heightened awareness of how
rules of governance should be structured in Ethereum by its users. Included in the EIP process is
a “Deferred” status that anticipates potential adoption of a recommendation in the event of a
future hard fork. This is emblematic of the overall EIP process attempting to normalize change
on the system, even proposing software forks as an alternative to bureaucracy to get wider user
buy in. In effect, Ethereum strives to allow users and developers to operate as self contained
actors, rather than improving processes to achieve consensus around all issues. Core developers’
openness to flexibility has also caused them to embrace hard forks in order to promote
continuous change in the system (Demeester 2016). The core development team of Ethereum,
consisting of Buterin and six other developers hold commit access to EIPs, and also sit on the
Ethereum Foundation Council. Many of Ethereum’s developers also worked on Bitcoin and thus
also have pre-existing relationships with one another. In the interest of transparency, the notes to
all the core development agenda meetings can be found online and users routinely comment with
ideas, reactions, and feedback (‘Ethereum’, Github.com)
Perhaps the most salient example of the power developers exert in decision rights
occurred in the prominent hacking of the infamous “DAO” in 2015. In understanding the
significance of the event, it is first important to understand the purpose of DAOs from a
governance perspective. Much like Williamson theorized, DAOs seek to mitigate transaction
costs, specifically agency costs in which residual claimants hold important power hierarchies,
information flow, and financial resources over shareholders. DAOs intend to eliminate agency
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costs by putting power in the hands of shareholders; in the case of Ethereum, this means
allowing people to vote on basic governance decisions with their Ether stake. For example,
DAOs can allow for votes that determine when and if to hire an employee, and also can pay that
person if the vote passes (Mehar 2017, 7). As Mehar notes, DAOS substitute “voluntary
compliance to a corporation’s charter with actual compliance with a pre-agreed computer code”
(7). One of the major advantages of the voluntary and distributed governance structure in DAOs
is its ability to empower minority owners in decision making (in contrast to shareholder
governance groups like ISS/Glass Lewis that represent shareholder views to companies).
The infamous DAO was created by Christoph and Simon Jentzsch, who envisioned a
company called Slock.it that was the foundation of a decentralized sharing economy (Mehar 8).
The basic structure of the DAO implied token holders that could release funds following
successful votes on detailed proposals on various types of investments (8). The DAO gained
considerable interest from investors around the world, with investments totaling $150 million. In
June 2016, a developer on the web based software development platform Github revelaed a flaw
in the DAO’s smart contract that allowed users to empty user balances over time without the
balance change being recorded. Despite protestations by Ethereum founders and Slock.it
founders, the DAO continued operations until it was hacked, five days later. The method of
attack was exactly as had been foreshadowed: the so-called “hacker” used the code flow to
repeatedly split the DAO’s balance into valid accounts in a duplicate DAO that could not be
accessed until one month after the request (Mehar 10). Counterattack measures were taken to
prevent the hacker from continuing the withdrawal, but he or she ultimately walked away with
$50 million, constituting nearly 15% of the worldwide supply of Ether.
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There were three courses of action proposed in reaction to the DAO “hack”. The first was
to protect the integrity of the code and do nothing; the rationale for this argument was that the
attacker had technically not committed a crime or injustice against the system in his or her
actions. The ability to slowly siphon money constituted a loophole in the smart contract. The
second alternative was to soft fork in order ban use of the duplicate DAO that contained the
“stolen funds”. The major ramification of this course of action was the loss of all investors’
Ether. Finally, the third choice was to get nearly universal consensus from all miners in order to
return stolen Ether to the original DAO. Surprisingly, the third solution was strongly advocated
for by the founders and core development of Ethereum, despite the fact that it violated the core
principle of immutability on the network. After a vote, the majority of miners chose to hard fork
and create a new chain where the blocks could not be tampered with. This spawned a forked
altcoin, Ethereum Classic, whose miners operated on the original network, having chosen not to
accede to the vote. The vote itself was controversial in that it prioritized voting power by users’
stake rather than “one user one vote” (12). As a result, users saw their Ether amounts double as
they now existed simultaneously on two different chains.
This event demonstrated some of the flaws in the decentralized governance system
proposed by DAOs. Developers’ decision to hard fork and thus deny the malicious attacker his
earned reward demonstrated that core developers in Ethereum view their role as managing the
technical system, and therefore superior to it. As Dupont (2017) notes, the algorithmic
governance\, governance of a system by code and code alone, promised by DAOs was never in
reality technology alone, involving the complex interplay of developers, miners, token holders,
and even the Ethereum Foundation, much like the basis for this analysis of the macro-level
cryptocurrency (12). In effect, Dupont notes “The DAO relied on a model of human behavior
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and social constitution notionally based on liberal ideologies, where humans act as rational, selfinterested, and untrusting agents” (13). The way that the funds were taken represents a deviation
from the expected result of the algorithmic structure, causes actors to fall back on social ties and
community orientation. For example, the Ethereum Foundation’s support of the hard fork left
many users themselves questioning the promise of decentralized governance when central
authorities clearly had the capacity to dramatically influence outcomes to protect their
reputations. In this particular situation, the return of the funds was only secondary to the
wellbeing of the system to external shareholders: to ensure safe and continued use, developers
ultimately had to make drastic code changes to protect their own vested interests. The
developers' themselves probably constituted a large degree of the favorable vote. The method of
voting during the DAO crisis also demonstrates some of the limitations in distributed governance
with respect to decision rights. Most crucially, decentralized voting procedures that require a
large percentage of stakeholder buy in to achieve consensus often must evolve over a long period
of time in order to achieve a result. The Ethereum community quite literally observed the hacker
stealing funds from the DAO without the ability to take action. Thus, the smart contract system
of aggregating votes was sufficient but not optimal for the particular situation given the time
horizon they were working on.
The issues faced during the DAO hack have been replicated in recent events, including
multiple hacks of the Parity startup system that have led to public calls for a more standardized
fund recovery system (O’Leary 2018, “Ethereum Users Are Losing Money and Developers
Don’t Quite Know What to Do”) A recent article by CoinDesk details this internal conflict. Led
by developers from a startup, Tap Trust, internal conflict regarding the ability of users to be able
to effect “state changes” in response to malicious activity has recently been present in the
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network. The hack had resulted in four proposed code changes that according to core developers
“conflicted with the ethos of Ethereum”. In essence, if exceptions to code could exist on the
network, the code itself would not immutable and its entire value proposition, its immutability
and automatic execution, would be threatened. A second attempted fork, to core developers,
would lead to more instability and set the precedent for continued regulation by developers of
malicious activity. A distinct compromise has arisen between the speed of response and loyalty
to code among users; many have voiced that Ethereum’s ability to adapt and act in users’ best
interests at odds with the code is one of its greatest advantages. In a sense, community wide
sentiment for code upgrades and changes should not be limited by the desires of core developers
if there is a majority shareholding interest. Those in favor of greater restrictions point to the
ability of core developers to heavily influence decisions as a negative aspect of the system
(O’Leary) . Youchi Hirai, a core developer on the network, wrote in a recent post: “I wouldn’t
move a finger for a recovery unless the amount is going to a few parties that can threaten the
network (then I would prefer vaporizing away the amount rather than giving it back)”. This brings
into question whEther and when certain governance structures should be used, and who should be
controlling their implementation (Hirai 2018) .
Ethereum developers are now seeking to improve and expand governance infrastructure
on top of the network. A follow up article by CoinDesk that covered the recent Ethereum
conference in Paris draws light on the ways developers are now considering governance. One of
the biggest issues with the most recent proposal was the lack of clarity/transparency with which
it was communicated to users. Greg Colvin, a prominent developer on the Ethereum network,
has recently formed a coalition to coordinate best practices for open-source development. Colvin
recalled the DAO decision among others as reasons to strengthen policies surrounding
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governance of the system in order to find better ways to achieve consensus. The Ethereum
community has expressed desire for more input in decision-making, which brings into question
what the role of core developers should be on the network. Colvin cited the close-knit relations
of core developers in the early stages of Ethereum development as crucial to achieving consensus
in top down decision-making, a factor that has since become more complex by the addition of
more core developers around the world. Colvin thus noted “in person communication” as deeply
important to the network’s integrity.
Colvin’s coalition aims to mitigate issues between the two major schools of thought
within Ethereum: the notion that “code is king” and the desire from users to see greater
transparency from the Ethereum Foundation regarding the direction and types of changes that it
wishes to enact. Stemming from the DAO fork decision, developers ultimately have the power to
propose action and thus control the two most important stages in the process: proposal and
enaction. Furthermore, even though there is an approval process, the discourse surrounding
whEther the change should be implemented is ultimately politicized. The purpose of the process
is to both create productive debate among stakeholders and allow the market to decide which
version of the software is more valuable externally. Ultimately, Colvin writes that he has found
that “it’s hard to arrive at a technical proficiency if there’s a lack of clarity as to the direction of
Ethereum”. Thus, the non-technical and technical governance aspects of Ethereum are
inextricably bound (O’Leary 2018, “Ethereum is Throwing Out the Crypto Governance
Playbook”).
In conclusion, Ethereum has attempted to build upon Bitcoin’s success by creating a
developing environment that is more open to change. The lack of governance surrounding
developers, specifically the autonomous nature of developing in Ethereum and the involvement

52

of the core developers in the founding of Ethereum’s primary funding structure, raises questions
about the amount of power concentrated within the group. Ethereum seems to be primarily
designed for developers, not non-technical users, thus making developers both the curators and
customers of the system itself. The power of developers was demonstrated in the decision
making process after the DAO hack, indicating the top-down and relationship driven processes
that core developers envision for the network. Finally, the reactions of the Ethereum community
from the DAO hack seem to demonstrate that increased attention will be paid to governance
moving forward.

CONCLUSION
Analysis of both Bitcoin and Ethereum reveals that both cryptocurrencies have rich and
developed non-technical governance structures that are crucial to their success. A descriptive
overview of each cryptocurrency reveals that while each proposes a unique technical system to
eliminate the need for TTPs, neither truly succeeds in eliminating the potential powers of
stakeholders. In Bitcoin, the rise of mining pools and the ability of users to use external financial
instruments to manipulate the price and profit gains create strong motivation to take over the
system. In Ethereum, the precedent set by developers in rejecting the DAO and forcing a hard
fork has created both the perception and potential for core developers to dictate the direction and
composition of the system. In both cryptocurrencies, a lack of formalized structure in adapting to
changes and accepting input from multiple stakeholders internal and external to the system has
resulted in periods of instability.
Despite the potential for manipulations, both Bitcoin and Ethereum remain relatively
popular. Their systems are utilized at a high rate across all stakeholder groups, and there remains
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to be a tremendous amount of excitement around the long term and lasting consequences on the
ways that transactions can be processed on each systems. Among cryptocurrencies, both Bitcoin
and Ethereum have generated strong followings that indicate they have community support and
potential to succeed. Furthermore, despite forking events and security concerns, the majority of
potential power usurpations have not been undertaken on the network. For example, mining
pools have existed and continued to grow without system-wide repercussions for Bitcoin, and
DAOs continue to proliferate and seek funding in Ethereum. The relative success of these
cryptocurrencies despite the demonstrated weaknesses in their technical interfact and governance
structures beg the question: given that there have been a number of opportunities to take
advantage of the system, why have there not been a proliferation of adverse events?
This paper hypothesizes that the answer lies in the very concept that Nakamoto believed
Bitcoin could overcome: trust. Throughout research on the topic of cryptocurrencies, trust,
especially among developers and by other stakeholders upon developers and miners to satisfy the
needs of system, has been a key theme. For example, the emergence of new lead developers was
based on their reputational value, rather than any technical interface. Much as Williamson and
March hypothesized, trust served as a mitigating factor that underscored sometimes ill-defined
governance based relationships within actors. Furthermore, trust could be a reason for their
ineffectiveness: for example, the desire of Ethereum developers to return money in the DAO
stems from the trust that they wanted to cultivate from users. This trust mitigates malicious
behavior because of pre existing communities and because of the intrinsic desire that
accompanies participation in the system. In effect, blockchain technology has in many ways
strengthened the need for better understanding of trust networks among individuals in order to
support the technological interface.
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The ultimate conclusion of this analysis indicates that the governance of cryptocurrency
reflects its theoretical promise: individuals’ desire to innovate to increase their stake and power
within any given system will always create the need for governance, regardless of the novelty of
the technical interface that underlies it. The need for actors within cryptocurrency, especially
miners and developer, to cooperate and collaborate across a joint resource in the long term
necessitates non-technical governance to ensure this innovation does not occur. Far from
achieving the utopian promise of technical governance, cryptocurrency has endured growing
pains resulting from the absence of these very systems. The technology alone is and will not be
enough to sustain the wellbeing of cryptocurrency in the long term. This is evidenced not just by
the conclusions of this paper, but by the actors within these cryptocurrencies themselves: as
previously mentioned, Bitcoin developers have begun to develop a richly nuanced decision rights
system since its fork, and lead developer Colvin is actively leading discussions about
strengthening the premise and rules within Ethereum governance. As March theorized, the
structure of governance within cryptocurrency is being bargained for by multiple stakeholder
groups (671). In effect, this paper highlights that stakeholders of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other
cryptocurrencies should actively be thinking about the design and structure of their governance
systems instead of attempting to avoid it entirely.
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